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Contmq  to the impression  given  by mst  mks,  mi  croecon&csis 
not  a homcgeneous  discipline.  At least  two  major  dLterr&iVe  theOriPc  exist 
which account for the long-run  behavior  of  Wiustrial prices and the 
allocation  of resources  betweeneconomicsectorsinwayswhi.charedistinct 
fromstandanlneoclassicalexp1anations.  E&hpostK2ynesianardClassical 
(bbrxian/NeoRimdian) approa&esto  emnanicshavedeveloped  agrowing 
literature  on micmfcundations  in recent  years (see,  e.g. Eichner,  1985; 
lxrmenil  & Levy,  1985). 
The  cowbtmm  ofthreeapparently imcqatibletheories 
for  any  scientific  discipline. In the  case  of  microecoawrmics 
explained,inpart,byanabsenceofan  orthdoxlitera~ 
iSClIlanomaly 
thismightbe 
whidl  suhnita 
their  econanic  theory  to  -isons  with  alternative  agpmdes,  thLls 
lending  cmdence to such alternatives  (Eichner,  1985,  p. 178).  MO-er, 
orthodox  theoxy  has  been  remiss  in  applying  the  "co-  test,"  i.e., 
the  generation  of empirically  testable  hypauleses,  toits ownprdktions. 
Ithaskeenaxquedthatneoclassicaleummicshasbeenmoreamcerr& 
with ccanprehensiveness  andaDherence  than with realism (see,  e.g., the 
aquments in IXmenil  & Levy,  1986). post-Keynesianard TheNewClassical 
microecononks,  sincetheyare relativelynewdisciplines,  havealsolaqely 
focusedon#eoreticzildeveloyxnentattheexpense  of enpirical  lzsting. 
AnotherreasaI  fcrthelackofefforts  suchasthis  om  inthepast  mayhave 
been the lack  of reliable  data.  F&centefforbbytheEumauofEcmanic 
Analysis  have  new  producd  cansistent i.nhtxy-level  data  on  an 
establihnentbasis, including  profit  variables  and assets  atreplacement- 
cost  valuaticms. l%rliere@ricalstuUeswereforcedtocowtmct~ 
1 .  . 
industxy  aggregates  f&small  firm samples  and to use book values of 
assets. 
If eamxnicsisto  advance  as a socialscierice,diverseaccounts  of 
conterfpraryeconomicphf3ncmena  shouldbesubjectedto amprative  empirical 
tf2stiK.J.  Inthispaper  afirstattmptismadetoappraise  empiricallyone 
aspectofthesethreeampetirqxnicmeamaCc  theories: their  explanations 
of industq-level  profit  differentials. 
Each theory  provides  a  different  explanaticn  of the profit  nrargin  on 
sales.  Since  all  three  theories  reccgnizethatccstsarei.nclWedinartput 
price,  focusirrgonthedeterminantsofthemarhp  ineffectpruvides a basis 
for test-  the thecries  of unit price.  Hai4ev~,aswillhse4m,our 
results  do net provide  a clear  empirical  differentiation.  The alternative 
predictions  are embedded  in axqlex ecormnictheorieswhicharecapable  of 
developing  alternative  scenariostoexplaintheeviderrcepmsenb3below. 
Nevertheless,  this evidmce  can helpdirect  future  theoretical  work 
into relevant  directicns. Fbrther  empirical  wrkmstbegintotestthe 
actualmxhamsm 
of each approach. 
our second  set of 
pc6it&bythetheoriesandpossiblyevendeeperaspects 
Wecnlyskimthesurfaceofsuchareseanh  Programin 
empirical  results  cancerning  imesbmt.  Hcpefully,  the 
real  value of this  researchisthatitwillactas  abase  forfurtherand 
deeper%crrespondencetests~l  oft!!threeaqetbqtheories. 
mefhtsectionofthispaper  summarizesthetheoretical~ 
The  follckling  8ection  discusses  the  eammetric  EBth&OlogyanddZ&tisCXlYXW 
used.  ThelastWosectionspresentthee@ricalresultsarAassesstheir 
relevance. 
2 II. axpting  Micmecodc  Appmach-  tc  Ix%%erial  Profit 
This &ion  attempts  to theoreticdlly  distbquish  three  canptixq 
micrceconmic theories:  The Necclassicdl,  the Post-Keynesian,  and the 
Classical  Theory.  In doing  so we will-to  -lain  both  what  the theory 
establishes  concerning  indusby-  level profits  in equilibrium  and what 
variables  are usually  us&  to explain  deviations  frm  this  hypathesized 
condition. 
A. Neoclassical  Theoxy  of  Profit 
Neoclassical  theory  envisions  the fimastheecomnicentitywhich 
hires~senricesofthevariousfactorsof~~arrlccmb~thento 
supplygwdsforamarket.  The  solemtive for  this  isthemaximizatioaof 
profits. Inthepresenm  ofvariableunitaxts,this  sirglemnditim 
sufficestodeteminethelevel  ofoutgaxtandtheccmpositionof  ingnksused 
in its  production.  The  profit  mximizaticm  criterion  mansthatthefixm 
willcontinueto~~outpltaslorrgasthe~inal  costofproducirgone 
moreunitislessthanthemrginalrevenueobtabedbyitssale.  Thusthe 
mass of profits  are being  maximized,  not profits  relative  to any other 
magnitude. 
Profits  in  neoclassical  theory  (scmtims called  ecomnic  profit)  are 
defined-as  in all other  theories-as  the exDessofrwmueswercost. 
Costs~~\mderstood  tOiXlCludethe~  to  capital  englayed,  i.e., 
interest.  Inthisconceptionofthefirm,opitalistypicallynat~as 
anassetownedbythefirnlonwhich  returnsIrustbe  maximized,kaatasa 
factor  of  prcductionwhc6e  services  are  hired  for  a pricecalled  interest. 
Profits  in  excessofinterestcostsarethusnutareturnt0anyfactorof 
pmduction,  but  a  form  of  rentwhichwill  accrue  to  the  firm  if  it  is  able 
3 to  sell its output above its cost.  This can occur only under two 
circumstances:  disequilibrium  or  a noncrq&itive m3Aet structure. 
This raises  the issue  of the conagt  of ccanpetition  ard mnapoly  in 
neoclassicdl  theory. Cmpetition,  acccm&q  to neoclassicdl  analysis,  is  a 
stateratherthanapmcess.  The stmctum  ofthemrket  (nukerof  fti, 
their  size  arr3  distribution)  detemines whether  or nut any individual  firm 
has  the  abilitytoaffectthelllarketpricebyvary~itsclwn~  leek. 
A ccmqetitive  market in  this  view is one in 
ability,  whereas  any marketsinwhi&fbms 




In a ccmpetitive  market,  -fore,  dmaM  price  will equal  marginal 
revenue,  sothatequatingIIm&Ml  zvenue  to  maqinal  ast  in  effect  will 
equate  price  to marginal  cost (figure  1).  It is  possible  for  cmpetitive 
firms to make profits in the shoti run  (i.e.,  when the market is in 
disequilibrium). mi.s-whenthe-~isStrOlYj~ 
relative  to nmrht  supply  that  the market  price  is higher  than  the fi.m@s 
minimm avemqem6t.UnderthesecorxWions,asshmminfigure2,setting 
w  so that marginal  revenue (price)  equals  marginal  cwt  will yield 
total  rev-  in  m  tutal  costs,  i.e.,  profits. 
4 Inthelongnm,  however,  theexistenceofpmfits  inaXly  iWustrywil1 
attractnewfixms.  mesmeqWntimcreSeinsupplywillshiftthemarket 
supply  curve  to the left (as  shmm  in figure  3) and drive  market  prices 
dawn. Thisprccesswillamtinueasl~asthereareanyecaranicprofits 
being &ized.  Eventually,  the market  prim  will be  driven  dawn to the 
point  where  it is equal to the firm's  average  tutal  cz6t  (as  well  as 
marginalcost).  Fmfits  inneoclassical theoxyarethereforeassmdto 
disappear  in  wtitive  long-run  equilibrium. 
Itiswortheqhsiziqinthis  c!mbctthattheadju!Sblmtpmcessin 
necclassical  equilibrium1  is based on the pusuit  of ecurmic profit by 
f~,not~theExlrsuitof~hi~rateof~anirnrestment  .  This 
isso3zecaumthe  rehrnstocapitalarefullyinclMedasirrterestcc6ts 
1At  least  in  its  Marshallianvariarfts.  Inwalmsiangmmil 
equilibrium,  there  isnoadjus&mtpmcessassuch.  Ram,thle 
auctioneer  insuresthatmnplete  intertesaporal,equilibrikmexists 
ateveryinstantinallidustries.  Theb&qmsablemleof 
theauctioneer  makestheaFparentlymregeneralWalrasiantheory 
an  extremely  special  case (Dmenil C Levy  1985). 
5 whethex  the  fimn ems  the capital-in which case the  interest  is the 
oppcrtunity  Cast-or the fimborrcws  it. Thereis  thereforenoparticular 
reason  to divide  profits  by any denominator. Specifically,  there is no 
reason  to divide  profits  by total  assets,  or by equity,  or even  by sales. 
This point is explicitly  mde  by Lmg  and  Ravenscra  ftinthei.rcOanmenton 
Fisher  &M&man  (Lcrq  &Rav-  ft 1984): 
.  ..if  capital  mark2ts  are ampetitive, the residual  of revenues 
werdllcosts(includingthenormdlreturnto~ital)a~to 
the entrepeneurship  function,  nut to capital.  1tstiumakes 
sensetoenvisionfinnsmvimginbareaswherethereturnsare 
highest,  but it makes  no sense,  fmn  this  perspective,  to divi& 
theprofitresidualbysam  masumofcapital. 
A  nonccqetitive  mar&t  is, in amtrast, chamcterizedbyfimswhi& 
individuallypemxive demand curves  whidxslcpe~  tosamextent, 
eitherbecausethefimis  a  significantfractionoftheentiremrketat 
because of  prcduct differentiation  (figum  4).  Therefore  the  firm's 
have  been  prcduced by  a  canpetitive  fim  (hence  the  familiar  wlfare 
conclusions against  mnaqetitive  market  stmcbms  by  neoclassical 
theory). 
6 This  mhrsh&q  of  competition  ard  umcp~ly  naturally  led  Lerner  to 
develop  his  irrlex  of  market  peer: 
P  -MC 
I  = 
P 
This  inlex  gives  a direct  measure  oftheextmttowhichfkmsset 
their  artprt  levels  belcw  ard prices  above  these  tich  equate  price  to 
Im&.nalccst.  ItraqesinvaluefxmO  fcrmqetitive  finmtclfor 
mm3polieswithzeromaqinal cc&. 
Unfortunately,theL4znerindexcarmtYtd&5cr~te  be&Teen  cases  of 
imperfect  ampetiticn  and  true  oligcpoly.  Asiswellknmln,freeentryin 
the former  case  mans  thatpricewillbeabcvemarginalcosteventhaqh 
economic  profits  have  been  driven  to zem by  the  influxof  fh  (althaqh 
there will exist uMemtili.zation  of  msmrces).  It  thus kmnB 
questiaMbletowhatextentapositi~~indexonbyitselfbe~ 
tomeanadegreeofmmpoly~  ThisprcnptEdFishertostateinhis 
reply  to ImJ  & Ranvenscraft's  CmmBnt (Fisher  1984): %n  irdustq  with  a 
highLe?mermeasure  ard  low  ecmKlnicrateof~doestistrikelneas 
ripe  for  antitrust  action.tl 
Morecver,theLernerindexmlnutkedirectlyusedwhenundertaking 
empirical  st&i.m of  pricirrg  and  mrket &mctmes,  Sin=edataOIlm;lmi.Ml 
costsare- 
inacmpanrts 
formula  above. 
available.  Usingprofitmrgimas  a  pmxyfortheLerner 
tosubstituting  avemgeWtalcc6tformaqimlccStinthe 
l%isisusuallyjusti.fiedbyassmirq  loq-run  equilibrium 
7 Using the profit rate on assets as a proxy mquires  the further 
assuxqtion  that the capital-output  ratio ard the capital-to-&her-assets 
ratio  is  uniform  acrossfims,asweshcwbelow. 
merateof  profit  on  assets  R is  given  by 
R = (P  -  AC)Q/A 
where  P isunitpriceof~,  ACits 
andAtatalasseti.lhenassmingAC= 
for  the  Lerner  index: 
aYe+c&,Qistbearputlevel, 
MC,  we have  the foll&ng  expression 
1 =  (p  -  x)/p  = R(A/k)  (YQ)/p  =  kR 
where  K  is  capitdl.  Thus thepzqortionality  factorkwillbe  m 
across  irdustrieswhenevertheabove-mmtionedccr&itimshcld. 
It follows  that  the  only  justificatim  for  the  use  of  the  profit  mrgin 
by neoclassical  theory is either  as an approximation  of the Lexner  index 
assumirq  MC = AC (i.e.,  whenthereareccnstant3ztuns  to scale),  or as a 
wayofnomnlizingeccmnicrents  for~yeammmtricreascms.  Tlmz  is, 
however,  no theoretical  justification  for 
either  a lmasuxe  of resaxceallocationor 
==PolY  l 
the  use of the rate  of profit  as 
of  the  degree  of fimn  or inaustry 
meach;rdluseofthese  measures  in the applied li~tum  raises 
serious  prablarrs. Profit  margins 
positive in  mnpetitive  markets 
equilibrium,  even  thoughthe Lemer 





iszero. The mre  existence  of profit  margins  could  therefore  be either  evidence  of 
departwes fran  lor~~-run  equilibrium  or frum  cmpetitive  mrket struw. 
All  empirical  studies  of irhstry pricing  have  fcplnd  significant  profit 
margins  (and  profit rates)  tobethenorm  forallindustries,  arxIoursis  no 
exception.  Short  of  attrihrtingthesetocontinual  disequilibriumeffects- 
aprapositioninimicdltothespiritof~lassicaltheory--arost~~ 
and theorists  have instead  adopted  an ex post facto  theozy  of Wxmal 
profitsN1  astheretzurnstithe  vial  factor of  praiuction. 
Theorists  can subsumethisreturn~castsanlthusresare  their  claim 
that (econanic)  profits  are eliminated  inlcq-nmeqilibrium.  Applied 
researdhershave~y~~tedd~diff~sas 
indicatorsof~ly~ratherthanopl~l~lenrelsofpaofit(see 
e.g.  Qualls,  1974).  Theydidthisontheassuqtionthatacertainlevelof 
profit margin (or rate) in the fim  or w  data was due to this 
entrepreneurial  factor. 
Aspointedoutabove,however,there  isnotheoretical  reasonto 
suppose  that  the  amnmt 
unifomacmss  industries. 
to find  a uniform  profit 
of vial  w  per unit  of  outgut is 
Arylyetthisiswhatis  assumedwhenmeexpecb 
maqininaqetitiveiMustriesasar&urnto 
thisfactor(asimilaraqummtcanbemxIefor  profit  rates). m  a 
neoclassical  star@oint,  m  wmld  qxct  under wtive  equilibrium 
conditiaple  a  r8nrkm  distrtiion  of  profit  margins  withamanvaluewhich gross  revenues,  there  should  be no significant  correlation  with  capital  or 
total  assets. 
To the wtent  that noncompetitive cmd_itiOns exist in some markets ti 
themrketpowerisin  factbeingexercised,thereshculdincontrastbe  a 
correlation  between  variations  in profit  maryin  and sane wt 
nEasure of  deppt  fran  artqetitive  mrket  structure,  such  as 
concentration  ratios. Fkana  neoclassical  pointofview,then,wewould 
expect  the  followirq  relation  to  hold: 
HZ=  Do  +  13l(conc.ratio)  + u 
where  PR is total  profits  net of intemst ccsts  kmt including  %o~ 
profit,"  Do is the  mean  profit  level  ard  u is a randan  term.  We bmld 
eP=t  a0  = 0,  2ud  01  > 0. 
Inpractice,no~l~ically-~~~~haveusedtotalprofits 
as a variable. This Udbe  ate  ikracbble ecally,  si.xe 
mdustriesvary  in  sizebyseveral  ozdersof~tude,leadirqtopmblems 
of heterpscheaasticity.  Italsoseemspara&xicalinmeCmticalternrs, 
since  it implies  thatafizmwaAdprefertcu&ertab  ahgeinvesbmnt 
overatirry~aslangasityieldsdafesrdollarsrrwrrwrrwrrwrrwrrwrroftotal~c 
profit. We will  therefore  also  ccnsider  profit  margins  in  the  equations 
above,  sc  that  the  follcwing  equaticn  will  be  e&k&d: 
pR/Q  =  0,  +  B1(ccx.  ratio)  +  u 
B.  Tim  Post-miaa  view of -  profits 
FQst-Keynesian  eccncmictheoryisnctyetawelldefimd,generally 
accepted~ofresultslik;etheneodlassicaltheory~lainedabcnre.  It 
10 has,  nevertheless,  attracted  considerable  attentioq'due  to  the  fact  that  it 
attempts  to txlild  into  the core  of its  theory  a realistic  analysis  of the 
behavior  of laqe  i.ndustrial  corporations  in advamxd market  ecohes. 
While a  number of economists  who disagree  on a muher Of issues  have 
oontributed  to this project,  an aaxmt  of their  camr=ol  views  can be 
Pm* 
MostFo6t-Keynesiansgenemllydividetheamtempora.xymrketeamcmy 
into  two sectors. Thefirstsectcramsistsofthcmixhstrieswhi& 
supply primary lmterials (i.e.,  agriculture,  mining, fomstry,  and 
fisheries).  Thissectorischaracterizedbyalaxyenu&erofpmAucemand 
rigid  supply  in  the  short  run. outputinmissectcrislatgely~ 
constrained;  itsmarket clearbyxmns  of  flexible,  -volatile,  priw3.. 
Thesecc&sector,which~wil.l  ccncemourselveswithbelcw,consistsof 
those i&ustrieswhichproduce  manufacturedgoah  missEtoris 
chaxacterized  by  large-scale  mterprises,  oligcpolistic  stm&mes  with 
priceleademhip,  a~~Icapital-inter~ivemethcds.~ 
T!hefocusofFo6t-Keynesianmicroecoawrni  c analysis  is  the  empirical 
behavior  of  the  %egacopt~ orlargeaxporateoryanizaticnwhi~dauinates 
theiMustrialsectcrofthe  m  (Kmycn,  1979:  Eicbner,  1985). The 
primary~ofthemegacorpistomaximizesdlesgrowth,SalesgrnwVlis 
themansbywhichthefhopens  ENWamm&~mtieswithinthe 
OryanizatiaI  fclr  the mEmqxmthierarcfiy.  Qcwthismaxilnizedby 
maintahigaamstmtxmrketshaminidustri~~at~F;nrrera~ 
2Here  we  are  discussing  only  those  Fat  IGynesian  theories  of 
Manufacturixq  prices  whi&  are empirically  testable.  Obvicusly,  Rst 
KeynesianEconcmicsisbroaderthanthissumary~. 
11 as  the  economy  or better,  while invesbnent  mves  frcm slowerqrow~ 
industries  to  higherqzuwth  sectors. 
HOWeVa,  tl-Ls  llmvem=nt  of w  does not necessarily  imply 
terdency  tcward  an equalized  rate  of  profit. megoalofthemegacmp 
a 
is 
growth  maximization  not  necessarily  profit-rate  maximization.  me  megacorp, 
rather  than  conceived  as a passive  agent  to mar&t forces,  is an active 
*  .  decision  maker,  settim~  the  target  rate  of  return,  debmmuq  thewital 
bMget,andmakinginvesbmtatxI 






pricing  decisions.  The  pricirq  decision 
them-Keynesiantheoryof~ial 
mdels of  priciq are  diffiailt  to specify  on 
writing  of this  highly-  sdmoL 
Alfred  Eichner  (1985)  has  provided  a  bstable  mdel of  the  detembaticn of 
the  mark-up,which~theprofitmryinonsales.  Eichner~stheory 
ofthemark-up is  a  long-runcmss-secticnalmdel. In~lcqnm,the 
mark-up  is detmminedby  thedaninantfim's  w  foracuiticm& 
funds  for  imestment  tosatisfyi&ustxygmwth,subjecttotheamstraint 
of the implicit  ccsts  of cbtaihq  these  M.  These  -licit  costs  to 
raising~laark-uparethelossofindustrysales,entryofrrewopital, 
ard  the  possibility  of gwernmnt  rehliatcryacticm  Inaaditicn,these 
costs  mst be  less  than  the  cost  of  bcrmwbq.  Eichner  (1976)  prwents  data 
which sham  #at  between  75 and 90 percent  of gmss  fixed capital 
wpenditum3inmanufacturirqisfinancedbyretained  Barnirrgs(qcaatedh 
Kenyon,  1979).  Thisevidence indicates 
corporations  do have  an important  degree 
mark-up. 
that,  to  a  large exterrt,  large 
ofdi!xmtionarypowmcverthe 
l.2 ~.&tractirq  frcm  the implicit  casts  of raising  the  mark-up  (which  will 
be disamsed later),  the  post-~eynesia~~  theory  of the mark-q  leads  to an 
empirically  testable  model of M&trial  profit  margins (where  the profit 
margin  is  an empirical  pro-  of the  average  i&ustrial  xmrk-q).  The mark- 
up  will be equal to the grmth  rate of the iMustxy mltiplied by the 
incrementdl  capital-autyxlt  ratio.  The  bxemWal  Capital-ouQut ratio 
detexmimshowmu&newcapital  isnecesSary  tosatisfyanyparticularlevel 
of gmwth  of output.  This ratio  is assumed  to differ  bebeen  in3ustries. 
Thus,  hie  have  the following:3 
If the Rxt-Keynesian view does explain  iMUzial 
+u 
mEu5c-ups  clmss- 
sectionally,  then  both  the  coefficients  061 inbstry  growth aM  the 
incremmtal  capital-autprt  ratios  Mdbepositiveandsignificant.  Thus, 
filr  6  ' 0. 
C.!PheClassical  Analysisof  Rmstrial  Profit 
The  classicdl analysis of  prices aMl  imbstrial  profit has been 
described  by a rmbr  of authors (Eatwell,  1982;  broil  & Levy, 1987; 
Flaschel  &  Semler,  1984;  Clifbn,  1977).  The  xmckrn  classical 
microecananicsisbasedoolthenotionthatquiteanothereccmuicthsory 
couldhavedevelcpedifthemuyinalistrevoluti~hadnot~the 
profession  amy  frun the analysis  which was beirrg  developed  by  Sm.+, 
Ribxuxb,mEfam.  In 





made in the 1850'S  which allalIBI  classical 
additive  n&el  as a prmfy  for ths nultiplicative  .  _~ 
mdel.  wefamdthatbothmcdelsproducesi.lnilarresults. 
13 econcmicstobecanelargelydiscarded.  TherwivdlofclassicdLeconmi~, 
a jOi&  effortby  NeoF2icazdiantiMa.?Xianecancarusts,hasrecentlyfccused 
attention an  the  problem of  microfoundations  of  aggregate econcmic 
magnitudeS  (IIumenil  & LEvy,  1987;  Fleschel  & Sk!mniler,  1984). 
The centzal  idea of the classical  analysis  of price formation  and 
m%strial  profit is ccqetition.  -titian  is nut here taken  to be a 
highlyidedlizedstateasisin~lassical  econmics,butas  a  realistic 
process  ofrivalrywhichcan  include  fixmbehaviorwhichmightbecmnsidered 
imperfect  canpetition  byNeoclassical  or  Fast-Keynesian  ecerncmics.  Rxduct 
differentiation,  advertisingandothermn-prioe  fomsof~tionare 
ce&ainlycanpatiblewithclassicalmqetitim. 
Likethepost-IUynesianamlysis,thefoam  ofclassicalmiBc3 
isarealisticanalysisofthefim.  ~,theclassicalsviewthefinn 
asaperatinginthe~ofthecapitalist-,notintheinterestof 
mnagement.  Pkinagers  are only  agents  ofthecapitalist.  lBecapitalist 
seeksto Illaximizetherateofre~onhis/herinvestedcapital~~is, 




pricing  decisions. Liketheneoclassicals,butunl.ikethe~-Keynesians, 
theclassi.calspltmoreenp=hasisonmarketmcbnim3.~,themarket 
. 
mechamm,  or  %nCsiblehaxi,~~  is  suppxed  towork sloulyand  iI&xrecisely, 
W~YWby~  perturbti~amibyidividualrivalras 
actions  by fins.  3%  long-run  result  of the  ambinatim of profit-rate 
.  maxiInizingfinnsandtheTxqh~  oftkmarkekwillbeatendemy 
14 for  the  rate  of  profit  to  be equalized across industries.  constantinternal 
and-  perturbations  mke  this  a process  of "gravitation,"  such  that 
an equalized  rate of profit  is never  acrhieved.  Rather,  actual  rates  of 
profit  are  held  within  the  vicinity  of the  average  rate,  and  will  be equal 
to itonlyaslong-runaverages. 
?heclassicdls~ratherlooseintheirdescriptianofwfiicha~ 
rateshouldbeequalized.  Presmably,  the  rate  of  return  oB1  tutal  assets  is 
an ex-post proxy  forwhatfim5  acballyatteqt  to equalize: themqected 
rate  of return  on invesbmt.  l?lismeasure(scpnetimescalledthe'ecorranic' 
rateOfreturn)isthediscauntedvdlueOfthestseamOffuture~f~ 
apartiarlarinvestment  .  Ibwer,  as  Eichmr  (1987)  mtes,  this  aggmqate 
ispmbably  lmkmwntoarrym  firm.  FiSherandMGCMUI  (3984)  have 
aqued  that, nevertheless,  atbntian can only be focused  anthis  ratio. 
Theyfurtheraquethattheactual  eaxmicrateof3xtunland#eaverage 
return~total~willdifferbecausethelattermi~~acarrately 
relatereturnstoinvestmnk  OurstMyamsiderstherateofmturnon 
Arage  repla  cemant-cost  capital, wfiich  is  used  as  a  pmxy  for  the 
"ecorKmic'  rate of return UTXW  the aSGux&on  that the shapes of the 
varioustimepaths ofthe futureprofits  of fixmswillaverageaxt  for  large 
Baggregates. 
Theclassicaleuxmi&salsohavemtca.refully~between 
retumaneqai~aWmturnontotalcapital.  In  Volume  II  of  Capital,  for 
example,  Eux  defined  total capital  as the sum of '*mAuctive 
(fixed  capital),  'Pcmeycapital"  (financial  assets)  and"ammdity 





m, this  di-ion  by  Marx  preceeds  hisamlysisofthedivisionofpmfit  into 
interest  ard  profit  of  enterprise.  In  Volume  III  of Capital,  Marx  discusses 
this  division  between  returnonequityandI&urnontotalcapital.  He 
seems to argue that the average  rate of profit  which is the result  of 
mximizing  efforts by  fims  is the  return  on  total  assets  (Marx,  1967, p. 
379): 
assming the  average  profit  to  be given,  the  rate  of  the  profit  of 
enteqrise  is  not detemined  by  wages, 
interest. 
but by  the  rate of 
Itishighorlow  in  inverseprcporticnto  it. 
In  my  view, the actual  object  of equalization  for Classical  theoxy 
shculdmoreacauatielybereturn~~~,netofinterestcostsoftotal 
capital.4 This  view implies  that  the  true  capital  of the firm  is its  net 
wxthwhetherthe  corporation  isplblic ormt,  khilethevalueofborraJled 
assetscanrmtbeccnsidemdtobeownsdbythefinn.  !Uh  view al& 
bnpliesthatfimscanincmdse  theirreturncnequi~attheexpenseofa 
risirqdebt-equity  ratio.  Hchmer,  risingdebtalso carries  -licit  cc&~ 
to the firm  in the form  of greater  instability  (e.g.,  gmabrvulmrability 
to deflation).  Cur  empirical  study euqloyspmfit  on fixedcapital and 
inventories  because  of datalimitaticns. Thus  iqblicitly  assmitq cmstant 
cross-sectionaldebt-equityratios. 
‘bisshculdbesoregardlessof  whetherthecapital  is 
owned or borrmwd  by the fimn.  Ifboxmwed,-i.san 
-licit  cc&z; ifcwned,theiqxtedintmwtrepresentsthe 
~~~costtothefirmofusingitsawnopitdlratherthan 
lmdiqitaztatthemarketrateofirhrest. 
16 -=-*k-*  (1+&/-q 
E  K  E  K 
mere %et  is  profit  net of interest and K is total assets, which is equal 
to loans plus  equity  (L  + E).  only  if  the  debt-equity  ratio  is  constant 
across  in3ustrieswillnetprofit  onequi~beprqorticnal  to  net  profit  on 
assets. 
The  classical  ccnnpetitive  process  which  equalizes  profit  rates  as 
defined  abcve  imol~es a double  mechanism,  or I'm  dynamic". ibis 
double  mchanign  mes  industry  profit  rates  tumrd equality  mly  in the 
longrun. Ontheonehard,fixmsinvestinthcseindustrieswithhighrates 
of profit  and  m  demand  in  those  ir&stries. w  supplies  met 
demandccmbaintstichforcedcwnpricesandpmfits.  Tthesampmxss 
also~r~inrevesseascapitalexitslcrwpr~fitsectars.  Thus,  prices  for 
the  classics  are  nut  set by  firm decisims, htrespandtcthe 
disequilibriumofthemrket. 
E@rically,  perfect  adjuslment  isnut~tcactuallyoccur. 
Only  long-m  average  profit  rates  shculd  be equalized  if  this  process  is 
actually  working.  In addition,  cnly inter-  rates  of profit  are 
m  to equalize  (as  opposed  tc v  profit  rates),  since 
within  imbstries  different  ccst  stmchmscanleadtodiff~  firm 
rates0fretlm,eWenthalghthei.Wustq~areequal~the 
eco;IxI[Iy.  ~,~classicalspositatypeof"quasi~~~'(IXmrenil 
& Levy,  1987)  which  allcws  for  mequal firm  rates  of  return  ccmistirg  with 
iMustxy equality,  while  the neoclassicals  assum  a  VUlln  equilibrium, 
describedabcve. 
17 In thismxlel, the  classicdl  equationwhich  explains  hlustrial profit 
mqins  ShaiLd  include  only the capitaluIt&ut ratio and the share of 
importsinda~~~-Licsales.  Equalized  rates  of profit imply  that profit 
maryins  must  be  adjusted in each i.Mustq  according  to the respective 
capital-mtput ratios so that each margin yields an equalized  rate of 
profit. 
In addition,  classicdl  econmists are amcemed  about international 
coqetition  which  they  see  as  an important  aspect  of  the  overall  aqxtitive 
P-*  Althugh  barriers to  entry can  exist dmwtically,  these 
barriers,itis~,~prevententryfromforeign~tms.  In 
the presence  of a world  mar&t for,  say,  steel,wtxkingwi~datawhich 
includesonlydanestic  f~nraywellbiasthecdlailatedrateofprofit. 
ThisissobecauseinaniMustzychara~zedbyvarying  rates  of  profit 
amngfim~~,thedmmsticsectorofthisworldmrketmaywellrepreserrtthe 
high-  (low-profit-rate)  segment.  For  this  reason  we inclu% a  foreign 
cmpetitionvariablepmxiedbytheshareof  imports  int&aldacmticsales 
of  edch  iMustry (for  a  disaxmion  of  this  variable,  see  Turner,  1980). 
Thus,  air  mdel  is  specified  as  follows: 
WQ=~+B~(Qpital/OuQut~atio)  +~(i.qortshare) +  u 
The  expectation  is  that  if classical  carpetition  iswxking,  there 
should  be a  significant  positive  coefficient  for  the  capital-artput  ratio 
but a significant  negative  coefficient  for  the import  share.  No other 
variables  mdbe  significant. 
D.  A Summry of  Diff- 
18 The above  specific  discussion  of the differing  empiricdL  apctations 
of  Neoclassical,  post-Keynesian,  anti  Classicdl  eccncmics  reveals three 
distinct  philosophical  outlooks  underlyimg  these  mtions.  One  might 
call these differing  outlooks  the ~linstitutional  four&tionslt  of each 
conceptionwhichgrouMthemreconmetehypatheses  wuchwearetestiq 
empirically.  Itisintere&ingtop&ltouthowthesediffeEnces  actually 
color  the  empiricdl  vtions  of  eachappmach. 
The neoclassical  ecmankt  sees capitalism  as a  system  in  which 
rational  inlividuals  mximize their  utility,  with  an invisible  hand  tich 
reconcilesdifferences  intoa situationoftotalmximmutility.  mefim, 
innecclassicalemrmnics,  isreallyablackbox,thruqhwhi~theownexs 
maximize  utility  in a situation  axpletely c  ixumscribedbynrarketforces 
(incapetition the firm's  sole  strategic  variable  is  the  level  0fouQut). 
Insuchasetting,itdoesnotmakesensetomximizer&xnsonadvanc& 
capital. Instead,whatisdesi_Edis  iIKxImoverandabuvetheinterest 
whichmstbepaid  fortheuseofmneyeitherinthe  fonnoflmrmwedfunds 
or equities. EQUityiSIllerelyanother  fom  of boxmwed capital  even  if 
bcmmwed  frcpn  one's self.  Thus, one finds neoclassical  ecom&ts 
unccanfortablebythenotionofarateofreturn~tatdlcapitdlandm>reat 
homewitha conceptionofrmt~iAxduals.  - 
The  ~-~ian~ianofcapitdlisnismorerealistic.  They 
trytoWdanthe  concreteknmledgethat~actuallyhavemmernig  firm 
behavior. StMiesoffixmsasozyanizationsrevealanactivemamgem& 
stmcWrewhichmakesdecisions  amcemiqawideraqeoftaryetvariables. 
Often  the  focus  of  attention  of  ~canchmye,si.ncethefutLmis 
19 souncertainthat~ing~chs~~icvariabletonranipula~canbea 
difficult  decision  (see,  e.g.,  Porter,  1976). 
mly,  mst-Keynesians  hypothesize  that  firms  are  organizations 
which are run in the interest of its  managers.  There  is  no  capitalist,  per 
se, in the 9mgacorp1@,  only a managmtstaff  which  acts in its  own 
interest.  The primary  goal of  mnagement is  r-rot  actually  profit 
maximization.  Managemntdoesnotcwnthecapital~whi~itdesiresa 
rate  of retxlrn.  Managers  receive  salaries,  andtfiebestwayto&.se 
salaries  is  to  maximizegrmth,evenattheexpense  oftherateofreturn. 
Highergmwthleadstogmaterinterml~tiesfor~which 
1eadstohigherImagerialincane.  Thuqthemrk-up  isa  strategic 
decisionvariable,  Md  it  is  settomintainorexpm3therateofgrwthof 
the  organization.  In  such  a cmception,  market  forces  play  a  minimal  role. 
It is  thedecisions  by fimswhichare  theprimaqexplanatmyvariablesof 
econcmicperforrrmance. 
FMherthanfccusirqcmindividudls  maximizingut.ility,theCl.assicals 
(bthNeoRicaxdimsandMmist)vieWthe  eaDmnyasmadeupOftmdistinct 
QpesofiMividuals,thc6ethatwnpmductivemsarmes  (capitalists)anl 
those  that  work  for capital  (mrkers). FbrtheClassicals,thefimisan 
organization  wfiicb  is  cwn& by  a  capitalist.  T?eal  mnershi~~~  as  opposed  to 
tUgaltl  mmership  involves  amtrclofkeydecisicns about  the  cperations  of 




Keynesian%  tit  key 
ofacapitalistwhoisintem&&in&tainiqthe 
ofreturnonthetctal.imesbmt  . 
recognize  the  phmmbmm  eaqbsized by  the post- 
decisions  am  x&e  by mamqmnt  w,yetthey 
20 understand  this fact  differently.'  Fortheclassicals,thecapitalistneed 
not  be  embcdied  in  a  single ixlividual.  Instead,  capital is a social 
relationship  which  can  be  pax-celled  out  We  many  individuals.  Managersare 
the embdimnt  of capital  since they collectively  perform  the functions 
which  were once centralized  in a single  irdividual  in an earlier  stage  of 
develapnent.  For the Classic&s, this  hyputhesis  iqlies bm  differences 
with  Post-Keynesians. 
the  primq  objective 
or a rate 
forces  are 
thissense 
of profit, 
ofthefimwillbeto  mximizeareturncini.nvestmnt 
noteammicrerrtorsalesgxuw&  seaml,lmrket 
seenasmre~thantheindividualdecisimsoffinm.  In 
Classicalsbelieve  inthe invisiblehard  intheorigirmlsenseof 
smith.  -titian  is a processs  inwhichmarketfonesnuveuleemnany 
m  atarget,  rather than  a  static amaqmmt  which  miles 
optimization  plans (an  auctioneer). 
. 
mJs,  behid  capting  conmptions  of  industrzdl profit  by 
Neoclassicals,  Fast-Keynesians,  and  Classicals lies  a  deeper  set  of 
institutional  differences. certainly  #Be  differeme!S  carxmt  be resolved 
byoneer@ricdltest.  Butitiscurhcqethateapiricalworkoncoxxete 
aspectsofeachtheoryoneventudllyletoan~ing~~dial~ 
ammg these  alternative  schools. 
wertwosets0f&ta:  A 4-digit  set  of 350  i&ustries for  the  year 1977, 
and a set of panel  data  consisting  of 20 2-digit  imiustries  for  the years 
1960-1980.  A  smaller 13 industry  set of data wfiich  in&&d  capacity 
21 utilization  was also  considered;  those  results  are  reported  in  Appendh A.5 
In bath estimations  we  considered  only manufacturing  industris.  The 
estimation  techniques  used  were  the  follming: 
1.  For  the  four  digit  inkstry sample,  simple  OLS  cross-sectional 
regressionswereemployed. 
2.  For the 24igit  panel 
d===d~eWpooling 
1960-1980,  d  performing 
data  setweestimatedtherelatims 
cross-sectional  data  clvertheperiod 
oxdimryleast  squares  with dullmy 
variables(LSDV)  regressions. 
Usually,LSWrqressionsassum  amstant coefficients  and  hbxepts 
which  vary  wer individuals  (MaMala,  1977,  p. 322). Howwer,  inalrshAy 
wewantedto  incorporate  intoaurmdelthefactthatpmfitabilityvaries 
wer the  lusiness  cycle  for  all  i&ustries. musweuseddllmiestcnKldel 
time-varying  (rather  than cross-sectionally  varyi.nJ)  inmmpkS  .  we 
includedanintercepttermforyear1and2Odummiesfor~~years 
respectively.  Each~variabletookthe~~lfor~assi~year, 
andzeroothemise.  Thusthehhrceptforanygivenyearisgivenbythe 
sum of the intercept  ten  and the coefficient  of the appmpriati  dumy 
variable. 
Diagncstic  F-tests failed to 
unresth~modelinwfii&slopes 
additiomlex@natoqpcwerthan  a 
reject  the  null hyp&hesis that an 
andhkmeptschangewertimahasm 
mdelwithamstant  slope  coefficients. 
Thus  the pcolirqmethod  used is  legitimate  for  thisdata set.  Weals0 
51t shculd  be noted  that deviation  fran  trend  capaciw 
utilization  is positively  ard significantly  related  wer  tim 
withprofitmaqinsonan  irrdustrybasis.  Thisrelationshipwer 
time  also  holds  for  acbxtl  levels  of capacity  utilization  ti 
industq  profit  rates.  Results  am report&  in  Glick  (1985). 
22 esthted  0~1:  IIy3del.s  0ver  two  subperiods:  1960-1970  and 1970-1980. Even 
~o~aChawtestindica~thattherewasm,overallsignificant  changein 
the coefficients  ever  these  two periods  at the 95 % confidence  level,  the 
differences  were nevertheless  de  to be 81practicdlly  SignifimrV,  given 
prior  knmledge of such  a structural  break  (Ehrbar  ard  Glick,  1986). 
Z4lthoughthe  4-digitsamplebetter  app  mximatedecmcanicallymeaningful 
industries,  we  tumed  to  2-digit data  because it  allows a  better 
approximationoflong-runtrex& ardofthetheoreticalvariablespc6itedby 
eachtheory.  Forexample,trerdratesof~onbecalailated,assets 
canbevaluedonareplacemntcc6tbasis,andtaxmarrd~canbe 
deduct&  frua profit. 
establi&mntbasis. 
IV.  Data&urcm 
A unique aspect  of 
regression  andlysis. In 
relationships  have been 
In  addition,  datacanbeobMnedanapu= 
this project  is the data set develc@  for the 
thepast, priciqmdelstichconsidered  industq 
forcedtomlyonir&lstqda~builtfrcmsmall 
samples of  firms allocated  to inctustries  by major pm.  Our study 
derives  profit  data  frcm  %NP  in 15  Caqmmts"  onmagnetichpe(mreauof 
EconadcAnalysis)  andCapitalStc&ardInvestmentdataon  a 
cost  basis  frcml  'wealth  Tape" (Rlrml of l%zmanic  Analysis) 




frmths  Bxmau  of Labor Statistic&, and~tionRati~  frun the 
"Micro  Data  Tape" (O.E.C.D.). 
our  variablesarec!onstructed  in  the  following  way: 
6ThisdatawasobMnedmrtesyofSam  EWnsteinofthe 
New  York  cooperative  Cauncil. 
23 PR=  profit =  GNP -  (wages  +  salaries  +  idirect  taxes + 
noncmpozate  wage  equivalent).  Depreciation  ad  net interest  are 
medwhen  specified. 
Q =output =currentvalue of idustryshi~ts 
KDR=  stock  of capital  per  unit  of output  atreplacemnt 
cost 
BVKlR=  stmkof  capital  athistorbal  book-value 
IKDFI=immmmt&capital_outExrtratio=~in 
inve&nsnt/chaxqeincutput 
GRsH=gmwthzateof  consbnt&llarshipnents 
=  Price  Ida=  ratio  of 
&lipllzs 
CR = 2-digit  concentration 
ratios) 
current-  tc  cznstae~llar 
ratios  (wigtad  averagesof  4-digit 
CZUDEV=  dwiaticns  of  2+igit  capacity  utilization  fmn 
GWX=  Alternative  mncentmticn ratice  (pemmt of  a.@xxt 




Profit  mazyin  or  mark-up 
(Imports  + sW=w 
current*llar  i.nve/  (Clmmt*llar 
replacement-  capital  stcck) 
Follcwirrg  a suggestian  by Either',  wecanstructea~byestimating 
the  followbq  relation  for  ea& iMustry  u&q  o&buy  least  squares: 
WheresHis  ocnsbHt-dcllarshi~,g 
rate,  ard u' is a mltiplicative  error 
logarithnofboth  sides  we  cbtain: 
isuIeannually~graJth 
bXTIl. ?hentakingthenatzLml 
'tiWaSmadebyVerf3al  cmmmicatimtctheauthors. 
24 WsHt)  =ln(%)  +  [l.n(l+g)lt+u 
where  u  =  ln(u’).  The OLS  estimations  for  this  equation  were  run  for  each 
industry  over the respective  periods,  ard the variable  GFSH took on this 
samvalue  forallthetinre-series  obsemations  of  each  idust~~.~ 
v.  Results  and  Discussion:  Part  1 
In this section  we  consider  the results  of the three alternative 
equations.  Alternative variables and  alternative  specifications  are 
amsi.demdinPgpendixA.  The results  of  the  fdgit  estimatimare 
presented  in  Table  1: 
8For eXMlple,  if SIC idustry 20 had an estimated  growth 
rate  of 2.3 % durm  the period  1960-1980,  then  GRSH for  SIC 20 
was  set to  2.3 for all v  anmal  -tions  of  this 
industry. 
25 Table 1 
murDigitRqressio.nResults 
0.8. Mamlfa,  1977 
(t-scores  in parentheses) 
(Dependent  Variable  = pR/Q) 
1  Equations  I  (1)  (2)  I 
i  i 
1  constant  I  .2369  .2308  I 







.0008  .00067 
I  (3.61) 
I 
(3*16)  I 
I=  -.0253  -.ol95  I 
I  I 
(-1.41) 
IS 
(-1*09)  I 
.065  .0900 
I  Adj.$  I  .0795  .0786  I 
I  I 
l  S.E.E.  I  .0062  .0062  I 
1  D.W.  I  1.26  1.27  I 
c 
At  the  four digit lwel  of aggregation it is iqossibletosqxuatenet 
interest fmn  profit.  Fmfitcanonlybedefinedasgmssvalueaddedminus 
payroll  l  Thismans  thattheneoclassical  equationmrx-iibe  e&hated. 
Insteadblm  aalpa?x  the  Ebst-Keynesian  apecbtions  with  those  of  the 
classicals,  andildI.de  amcmltmtion  ratios  aId  ix&o&  share  in  both 
equations. 
Intheclassical  equatimIoJR  (total  fixedassets/  aA@)  ispositive 
adsignifimrrt,whilethe  amentration  ratio is stru@y  related to the 
26 profit-margin  differentials.  tis  is  a  stronger  relationship for 
concentration  than  dly  found  in  the literature  (Bain,  1951;  Mann,  1966; 
Stigler, 1963).  ‘Ihe  Post-Keynesian  equation  also displays  a  strongly 
significant t-score  for  concentration, 
significantly  related to  profit margin 
incremntal  capital-output  ratio  is  rmt  at 
have  low  R2's. 
while  growth  rate  is  also 
as  predicted.  However, the 
all  significant.  Both  equations 
nwhqful  definition  of industries, 
approach  oubdgh  this  advantage. 




cannotbefinelywnhmted.  The lattertbmconsiderationsam~ially 
illlpOr&YlL  We are  testiq three  lorq-run  theories  of idustrial  profits 
whici~  m&.re  capturiq  the  behavior  of  ecomnicvariablesoveraperiodof 
tinm. Asirqleyearcmss-sectimal reqressimminly capbresthe effects 
of disequilibrium  (Brazen,  1970; Ehrbar/Glick,  1986).  In  acklition,  the 
inclusion of  hdimct  taxes in  the profit 
replacement cost  masum  of  capital, and 
inventories  in the  measure  of capital  further 
numrator, the lack of a 
the  inaJ3ility  to  incltie 
limitstheusefulnessofthe 
four-digit  data.  Earlier studies  have shown that these differences  in 
variable  definitions  can have significant  hqact  on euxmdricresults 
(Glick,  1985). 
Table  2 pmsenks axpwledregressionresults  forthethree  equations 
basedonthe2-digitpaneldataseriesdescribedabwe.  Paneldataallcws 
for tests of lcnrg-run  relationships  cm6s-sectionally. In effect,  we 
. 
obtaned  mltiple  mltivariate  observationsforasetofidividuals(the2- 
27 digit  iAust.ries) overtime,  whichallowsu~to  seepaStthelargenoi_se 
camponent P==n t in  a  given year and obtain inprw~aziefficientestimates 
with  1me.r  standard errors.  By restricting  our  inAustries to a 2*git  SIC 
basis,  we  were  able  to  obtain  a finer definition of  our variables on  a 
consistent establishment basis.  The results are displayedbelow: 
Table  2 
TWoDigit  FooledReqe!ssioxlResulta 
U.S.  Manufacturiq  1960-1980,  1960-1970,  1970-1980 
(T-Scores  in  parenuleses) 
(Dependent  Variable  = PR/Q) 
lEquations  (la)  (a)  (lc)  (2a)  (a)  (2c)  (3a)  (3b)  (3c) I 
i  i 
;const.  1  0.0948  0.1017 
I  1  (45.8).  (36.3) 
ImR  I 
I 
Im  0.083  0.085 
*  *  ;  0.0870  * 
(30.6) 
*  * 
0.0878  0.0976  0.0683 
(5.08)  (4.20)  (2.72) 
0.085  0.059 
(4.68)  (4.44) 
-0.164 
(-3.35) 
0.054  0.067  0.106 












0.119  0.10381 
(7.02)  (6.09)  I 
I 
0.088  -0.1591 
(1.08)  (-2.66)  l 
I 
(6.27)  (4.69) 
0.304  -0.317 
(2.29)  (-2.25) 
0.0684  0.0466 
(8.14)  (5.04) 
0.345  0.305 
0.300  0.258 
0.086  0.092 
0.084  0.088 
0.091  0.225 
0.087  0.180 
0.0422  0.0402 
0.189  0.224  0.324 
0.138  0.175  0.283 
010376 
I  I 
[S.E.E.  1  0.0424  0.0416 
I  I 
0.0404  0.0401  0.0364  0.0381 
I 
1D.W.  I  2.17  2.27  2.17  2.20  2.15  2.27  2.25  2.27  2.361 
c 
Each of the three equations defined above are estimated in 
table  2  over  three  sample periods.  Equations  la,  lb, and  lc, 
estimate the Neoclassical equation for the subperiods 1960-1980, 
28 1960-1970,  and 1970-1980  respectively.  Equations  2a, 2b, and  2c 
present  results  for  the  Classical  equation  over  the  same  three 
subperiods,  and  equations  3a, 3b, and  3c are  estimation  results 
for the Post-Keynesian  equation  for the three  sample  periods. 
For  the  Neoclassical  estimation  net  interest  was  removed 
from profit,  since it represents a cost  in Neoclassical theory 
and  not  a  return.g  In addition, two other changes were made. 
First, no  dummy variables were used  in the regression equation; 
second,  the  independent  variable  --concentration  ratios--was 
expressed  in  deviation  form.  These  last  two  changes  were 
necessary in order to force the intercept term to equal the mean 
level of profit margins for the entire sample.I* 
Casual  inspection  of  the  results  of  table  2  yields  a 
remarkable fact about all of these models:  they only account for 
a small fraction of the observed variation in profit margins, as 
evidenced  by  their  R21s.  Even  if  some  of  this  could  be 
attributed  to  excluded  variables  (which  the  models  do  not 
specify,  however)  the  conclusion  is  inescapable:  the 
disequilibrium effects are a large, perhaps even the larger, part 
of the story.  This  is a result which does not lend comfort to 
any of the economic theories considered here. 
gThi8 adjustment made no measurable difference to the values 
of PR/Q, however. 
loIt should be noted that the profit term for equations la, 
lb, and lc, still contain depreciation.  However, this inclusion 
can  only  account  for  a  fraction of  the  observed  profit.  For 
manufacturing  as  a  whole  depreciation  represents  approximately 
30% of net profit. 
29 Turning  to  the  first's&  of  three  equations, we  see that 
substantial  profits  (defined  as  profit  margins)  are clearly the 
norm  for U.S.  manufacturing  industries,  ranging  from  8% of sales 
in  the  1970's  to  about  10%  in  the  1960's.  In  addition,  the 
effect  of  concentration  ratio  on  profit  margins  is  highly 
significant, although the percentage of total variation explained 
by  this  variable  is quite  small.ll  The  Neoclassical  equation 
thus does little more than measure the size of the profit 
so it predictably produces a relatively low R2 of .086. 
The  Classical  equations  2a,  2b,  and  2c  explain 




share.  If resources in a capitalist economy are distributed so 
that an equalized rate of profit between industries emerges, then 
each industry's profit margin should be adjusted according to the 
size of the capital-output ratio to yield this equalized return 
on  capital.  In addition,  classicals stress  the  importance of 
international competition.  The import share of sectoral domestic 
sales is used to capture this phenomenon. 
All three classical equations (2a, 2b, and 2c) find a highly 
significant  positive  relationship  between  the  capital-output 
ratio  and  the  profit margin,  lending support  to  the  classical 
contention.  This  relationship  is  strongest  for  the  entire 
period,  and  deteriorates  a  bit  for  the  subperiod  of  the 
IIOur strong results concerning the impact of concentration 
ratios on profit margins compared to previous literature is most 
probably the result of the larger number of observations in our 
sample due to pooling. 
30 seventies.  Likewise,  the  import  share  produces  the  appropriate 
negative  coefficient  and  is  also  highly  significant.  As  the 
Classicals  would  expect,  the  relationship  of  the  profit  margin 
and  import  share  is  stronger  in the  1970's  than  in the  1960's. 
For  the  latter  subperiod,  the  import  share is not statistically 
significant.  Concentration, as  in the Neoclassical-  equations, 
maintains  its  significant  impact  on  profit  margins,  with  a 
slightly weaker relationship for the 1960's. 
The  higher  adjusted-R2  for  the  classical  equations--along 
with  the  significant t-statistic for the capital-output ratio-- 
seems to  indicate that  the  classical theory  does  a better  job 
empirically in explaining how firms actually allocate resources, 
as well as how the market forms prices.  The classical equations 
appear to  show that firms are maximizing the rate of profit on 
total capital, rather than simply seeking out economic rents as 
posited by neoclassicals. 
The  Post-Keynesian theory  is represented by  equations  3a, 
3b, and  3c.  For the  20-year sample, the Post-Keynesian theory 
obtains mixed  results.  The t-statistic for the long-run growth 
trend  is positive,  but  not significant at the  .05 level.  The 
incremental capital-output ratio, however, is highly significant. 
Overall,  the  adjusted  R2  is  superior to  that  produced  by  the 
Neoclassical or the Classical equations. 
The  subsample  regressions  reveal  the  reason  for  the  weak 
relationship between the growth trend and the mark-up or profit 
margin.  In the 196Os, there is a significant positive relation- 
31 ship  between  the growth  trend and the mark-up.  Coupled with  the 
significant  relationship  with  the  incremental  capital-output 
ratio,  this  seems  to  garner  support  for  the  Post-Keynesian 
scenario  for  the  1960's.  The  results  of  equation  3b  can  be 
interpreted  to mean  that profit  margins  were  determined  in such a 
way as to obtain the necessary funds to satisfy the long-run rate 
of growth.  The positive relationship between concentration and 
the  markup  is  also  expected  since the manufacturing  sector  is 
considered to be dominated by oligopoly. 
The  interesting  result  for  the  Post-Keynesian  examination 
comes  in  the  subperiod  1970-1980.  During  this  period,  the 
expected sign for the growth rate is not obtained.  Instead, we 
find a negative and significant relationship between the rate of 
growth  and  the  profit  margin.  Industries with  higher  profit 
margins  displayed  slower  rates of  growth  for  this  period,  the 
opposite of what Post-Keynesian theory posits.  In addition, the 
import share  is again highly negative and significant  for this 
period.  This  result  is  an  anomaly  for  the  Post-Keynesian 
microeconomic  theory  and  might  indicate  that  its  empirical 
relevance is restricted to certain periods rather than others. 
There are a number of minor puzzles in the varying levels of 
significance of the coefficients in the three alternative models. 
In some cases, these can be better understood by referring to the 
calculated  correlation  coefficients  between  the  various 
independent variables.  Inspection  of  the  t-statistics  of  the 
concentration-ratio  coefficients  reveals  that  this  variable  is 
32 more  significant  for  the  Neoclassical  and  Post-Keynesian  models 
than  for the  Classical.  This  can be understood  as the effect  of 
excluding  the  variable  KOR  (capital-output  ratio)  from  these 
models,  since  the  correlation  between  KOR  and CR  for the twenty- 
year  period  is  0.290.  Thus  the  variable  CR  gains  some 
explanatory  power  when  KOR  is so excluded. 
Likewise,  the  remarkable  level  of  significance  for  IKOR  in 
the  Post-Keynesian  model  is  in  part  due  to  its  twenty-year 
negative  correlation  with  IMSH:  -0.280.  This  also helps  explain 
why  IMSH  became  insignificant  in the  Post-Keynesian  model  during 
this  period  even  though  it  was  highly  significant  in  the 
Classical  model. 
The  results  of table  2 begin  to reveal  important  information 
about  the  actual  process  of  competition  thereby  giving  us 
direction  in  comparing  competing  analytic  traditions  in 
microeconomics.  However,  as  discussed  earlier,  each  of  three 
theoretical  tendencies  being  tested  are  part  of  a  larger 
integrated  theory  capable  of  accomodating  a  large  range  of 
empirical  observations. 
The  Neoclassical  theory  would  have  no  trouble  in  arguing 
that  the significance  of the capital-output  ratio  results  because 
it is a measure  of a barrier  to entry  for  firms  seeking  economic 
rents.  The  growth  rate  can  be  seen  as  a  measure  of  dis- 
equilibrium  in the  market  (although a long-run  disequilibrium  is 
inimical  to the spirit  of Neoclassical  economics),  and the  import 
33 share can  have a  strong  impact on market structure  (see, e.g., 
Shepherd, 1982). 
The Classical theory can justifiably argue that  the rate  of 
growth  is  only  significant  because  it  Captures  long-run  dis- 
equilibrium  in  the  process  which  equalizes  the  rate  of  profit 
across  sectors.  The  superior performance  of  the  incremental 
capital-output ratio might be difficult to account for, although 
an argument might be made that it better represents the capital- 
intensity  of  industries  than  does  the  average  capital-output 
ratio.  During the 196Os, industries with high profit rates also 
had high rates of growth.  During the 197Os, high-rate-of-profit 
industries were  particularly  hurt  by  imports  and  their  growth 
rate declined, even though they absolutely still had higher rates 
of profit. This  explains why  in the 1970s growth  is negatively 
related  to  profit  margin  while  the  incremental  capital-output 
ratio remained positively related.l* 
Finally,  the  Post-Keynesians  can  certainly  deal  with  the 
troublesome  results  for the  1970's in the  following way.  The 
rising  import  share  in the  1970's indicated that  the  implicit 
costs of raising the mark-up to  obtain the necessary funds for 
investment had increased since the 1960's.  As a result, firms no 
longer could rely on retained earnings for investment as in the 
past.  Instead  firms in industries with higher growth rates had 
l*A similar process was described for the 1920's by Epstein 
(1934). 
34 to rely on capital  markets  and rising debt-equity ratios in order 
to maintain  market  shares  in these industries. 
The  three plausible alternative scenarios  for our  results 
illustrate  the  fact  that  the  "correspondence  test"  described 
earlier cannot be a single decisive event, but must actually be a 
process which penetrates to successively deeper levels of theory. 
Like  an  onion,  theoretical systems are multi-layered, with the 
most fundamental propositions deep within them  (Quine 1961).  We 
have  only  brought  empirical  evidence  to  bear  on  the  outside 
layers.  Below we attempt to move in one layer deeper. 
VI.  Results an& Discussion:  Part 2 
In this section we examine the expectations of each of the 
three  theories  concerning  resource  allocation  through  the 
investment  function  in  order to  help us  interpret the  results 
presented above.  Behind each of the above scenarios concerning 
the determination  of  industrial profits  is a conception of the 
way  in  which  a  capitalist  economy  allocates  resources  among 
industries. 
The  comparison  of  the  competitive  process  of  dynamic 
resource allocation is problematic for Neoclassical theory.  In 
general,  competition  is  described  as  a  state  rather  than  a 
process, and the actual dynamics of microeconomic adjustment have 
always been emphasized less than the analysis of the equilibrium 
state itself.  In the case of Walrasian general equilibrium this 
is carried to extremes.  In the Walrasian model disequilibrium is 
35 ruled  out  by  definition:  adjustment  takes  place  through  the 
agency  of an auctioneer.  In the Marshallian  models  which  are 
generally  used  by  industrial  economists,  however,  there  is  no 
such  deus  ex  machina.  Firms  are  theorized  to  direct  investment 
to  industries  which  offer  the  highest  economic  rent.  Thus,  for 
Neoclassical  theory,  we  model  investment  as  a  function  of  net 
profit  (normalized  by output). 
Classical  microeconomics,  as described  above, emphasizes  the 
fact  that  firms  seek  to maximize  the rate  'of  return on capital. 
Investment will be directed to those sectors with rates of profit 
higher than average and away from those with below-average profit 
rates.  Thus,  the Classical investment function makes  flows of 
investment a function of the rate of profit.13 
Finally,  the  Post-Keynesian  theory  views  investment  as  a 
function of  growth.  The mark-up  which  was  studied above,  for 
Post-Keynesian  theory,  is  conceived as  a method  to  obtain  the 
necessary  funds  for  investment.  For  the  Post-Keynesians,  we 
therefore model investment as a function of the long-run industry 
growth trend, approximated by the variable GRSH. 
Table  3  presents  the  empirical  results  for  the  three 
alternative investment functions: 
13  The  classical  investment  function  actually  makes 
investment  a  function  of  capacity utilization  and  the  rate of 
profit.  For a more detailed account, see Dumenil & Levy (1987). 
36 Table 3 
Investment Functions 
(Dependent  variable = I/K) 
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Table  3  estimates  the  investment  functions  for  the  same 
three  subperiods  as  in  table  2.  Eguations  la,  lb,  and  lc 
estimate the Classical investment function for the periods 1960- 
1980,  1960-1970  and  1970-1980.'  Equations  2a,  2b,  and  2c, 
estimate the Neoclassical investment function, and equations 3a, 
3b, and 3c, display the results for the Post Keynesian investment 
functions for the same subperiods respectively.  Equation 4a, 4b, 
and 4c combine the Post Keynesian and Classical eguations.14 
Since the  first three equations each predict  investment on 
the basis of one independent variable, the unadjusted R21s  are a 
valid measure  of their comparative explanatory power.  The rate 
14  Net Profit could not be added to this equation because 
of high multicollinearity with the profit rate variable. 
37 of  profit  displays  the  strongest  explanatory  power  concerning 
investment,  lending  support  to  the  Classical  scenario  of  our 
earlier  results.  The coefficient  for the  rate  of profit  is both 
positive  and  highly  significant  in  each  subperiod.  The  profit 
margin  is also  significantly  related to investment but not to the 
degree that the rate of profit is. 
Finally,  the  growth  trend  makes  a  poor  showing.  It  is 
weakly  significant  for the  entire period  and  insignificant for 
both  subperiods.  This  is an intriguing  result.  The most likely 
reason for this is that over a 20-year period, sales and capital 
stock must  be  rising at approximately the same rate, since the 
capital-output  ratio  changes slowly,  if at  all.  On  the  other 
hand,  over  shorter  periods,  the  fluctuations  in  sales  due  to 
business cycles will tend to disrupt this link with the growth of 
capital.15 
VII.  lummary  and  Conclusions 
This  study  has  been  motivated  by  the  conviction  that 
competing  theoretical  traditions  in  economics  should  be  taken 
seriously by the profession.  Once the logical coherence of these 
theories  has  been  established,  conflicting  theoretical 
l5  This result is in stark contrast to studies which show 
that  year-by-year  changes  in  the  rate  of  growth  of  sales  are 
related to investment (Stigler, 1963).  The growth rate that has 
been suggested by Eichner and which is used here assumes that the 
expected  future  growth  rate  is  adequately  estimated  by  a 
contemporaneous  longrun trend.  Another  possibility  for  future 
research  might  be  to  try  backward  moving  averages  or  an 
exponentially  smoothed  forecast  of  sales  as  perhaps  better 
proxies for expected future growth of sales. 
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considered 
must  be  settled  by  empirical  tekt.  We  have 
the  case  of  the  Neoclassical,  Classical,  and  Post- 
Keynesian  microeconomic  theories.  A  careful  reading  of  each 
theory reveals a coherent, self-contained discourse.  Therefore, 









test.  At a first level, we attempted to test the three 
explanations of industrial profits.  We found that the 
and Post-Keynesian theories both fared well.  The Post- 
theory,  however,  was faced with the anomaly that its 
seemed to accurately describe the  1960's, but  did not 
the facts of the 1970's.  Nevertheless, we argued that 
comparisons are not a simple matter.  Advocates of each 
appeared  to be  capable of  explaining the  full set of 
theoretical results within their own paradigm. 
The fact that regression results such as ours do not clearly 
differentiate complex theoretical traditions shows that a naive 
empiricism  is not warranted.  On the other hand, this need not 
imply  a  relativistic  Kuhnian  conclusion  about  incommensurable 
paradigms.  Instead,  we  have  argued  that  the  *'correspondence 
test"  must  be  carried  out  for  successively  deeper  levels  of 
theory.  We have tried to move one level deeper, by empirically 
investigating the  predictions  of the  three  theories  concerning 
their dynamic predictions for resource allocation.  We did this 
by estimating three competing investment functions.  Our results 
appeared to imply a clear superiority 
This  result  contrasts  with  earlier 
39 
of the Classical approach. 
work  on  investment  which considered  short-run  rates  of  growth of sales rather than long- 
run  growth  trends.  This  might  indicate  that  a  better  Post- 
Keynesian  specification  of its theory  is necessary. 
Unfortunately,  we  cannot  offer  comfort  to  any  clear 
theoretical  victor,  nor  solace  to  those  whose  efforts  have  been 
less  successful.  Instead,  a  dialogue  between  competing 
approaches  in  economics.  But  as  an  important  part  of  this 
dialogue  we  would  ask  that  the  ground  rules  emphasize  a 
commitment to generating testable propositions and a willingness 
to subject them to comparative empirical examination. 
Appendix  A 
Altem8tiva  Variable8 
This  appendix  presents  empirical  results  concerning  the 
determination of industrial profits using a number of alternative 
variables.  The variables are defined in the data section.  Table 
4 presents these results: 
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The  equations use  the  same subperiods  as  previously.  The 
first three  equations  substitute the  historical  book  value  of 
capital  in  the  capital-output  ratio  for  the  replacement-cost 
measure  used  above.  In  all  three  subperiods  the  ratio  of  book 
value  of  capital  to  output  is  insignificantly  related  to 
industrial profits. 
Equations 2a, 2b, and 2c, use an alternative measure of the 
concentration  ratio,  defined  as  the  percent  of  value  added 
produced  by  four-digit  industries with  four-firm  concentration 
ratios of at least 60 percent for the year 1966 (Shepherd, 1982). 
We  find that this variable also performs poorly compared to the 
traditional concentration ratio.  This may be the result of using 
the 1966 ratios for the full span of years. 
Equations  3a, 3b, and 3c add the price  index to the Post- 
Keynesian  equation.  The  price  index  is  positive  and 
significantly related to  industrial profits  in every subperiod. 
This is probably an indication of that inflation is not entirely 
cost push.  Industries with higher rates of inflation also obtain 
higher mark-ups as a result. 
Finally, equations 4a, 4b, and  4c, test the  impact of the 
deviations  from  OLS-estimated  trend  values  of  capacity 
utilization for a smaller 13-industry sample.  We find that this 
variable is also insignificantly related to industrial profits. 
42 Appendix B 
The Empirical  Comparison  of Competing  Paradigms  for Europe and 
Japan 
The  same  basic  analysis  presented  above  also  underlies  the 
analysis  presented  in  this  appendix,  i.e.,  that  competing 
microeconomic  conceptions  can  be  compared  empirically.  Although 
one  simple  test  may  not  be  adequate,  this  appendix  furthers  our 
goal  of developing  an  ongoing  dialogue  among  alternative  schools 
which  is empirically  based.  The  specific  value  of this  appendix 
is that  it undertakes  the  identical  empirical  test which  appears 
in Table  2, but  for  four  European  Countries  and  Japan.  Since  a 
separate  data  base  was  employed  with  a  distinct  manufacturing 
industry  breakdown,  the  three  equations  were  also  estimated  for 
the  United  States  as a control  mechanism.  The  results  appear  in 
Tables  5A  -  5G.  Table  5G  aggregates  the  six  countries  for  an 
estimate  whose  unit  of analysis  is most  of the developed  world. 
Methodology 
The  methodology  employed  in  this  appendix 
that described  in the methodology  section  of the 
cross  sectional  regression  was  estimated  which 
is  identical  to 
paper.  A pooled 
included  dummies 
to  model  time  varying  intercepts.  Diagnostic  F-tests  failed  to 
reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  an  unrestricted  model  in  which 
slopes  and  intercepts  change  over  time  has  no  additional 
explanatory  power  beyond  a  model  with  constant  slope 
coefficients. 
The analysis 
industries  which 
considered  the following  thirteen  manufacturing 
are  akin  to,  but  not  identical  with,  the  2- 
















Non ferrous ores and metal, non radioactive 
Non metallic minerals. 
Chemical products. 
Metal products, except machinery and transportation 
Agriculture and industry machinery 




Food, beverages, and tobacco 
Textiles, clothing, leathers, and footwear 
Paper 
Rubber and plastics. 
Miscellaneous 
Id 
The Countries studied were the following: 
Countries Studied 
1.  Germany 
2.  France 
3.  Italy 
4.  United Kingdom 
5.  United States 
6.  Japan 
7.  Total 
The total was derived by aggregating the six nations.  This was 
possible  since the data are on a consistent industry basis and 
expressed in a common currency. 
Data Sources 
Data was derived from the EUROSTAT data base.  EUROSTAT was 
the  result  of  a  project  which  utilized  O.E.C.D.  sources  to 
develop a consistent industry and currency basis for a number of 
European countries, the United  States and Japan.  The O.E.C.D. 
derived  its  data  from the  national accounts  of  the  respective 
countries.  In  some  cases,  the O.E.C.D.  sponsored projects  in 
44 these  countries  to  supply  missing  information.  I then  selected 
only  those  countries  for which  capital  stock  data was available, 
since  not  all  countries  have  developed  estimates  for  fixed 
tangible  wealth. 
The data are cruder than that used in the paper.  Output  was 
proxied  by  value  added  rather  than  shipments,  since  constant 
dollar  shipments  contained  numerous  missing  values.  Capital 
stock excludes inventories, and profit was derived by subtracting 
total wages from value added.  The profit variable thus contains 
net interest, indirect taxes, and depreciation components which, 
although small, may vary across industries.  In addition, no non- 
corporate wage  equivalent was subtracted.  Concentration ratios 
are not available for these countries, and utilization rates are 
only available at the aggregate level (from other sources). 
As  described  in  our  earlier  discussion  concerning  the 
competing merits of using 4-digit and a-digit data for the United 
States, the analysis of European data also presents a trade off 
between greater coverage  (in this case to additional countries) 
and finer variable definitions. 
The  variables  were  constructed  in  the  same  manner  as 
described earlier in the paper: 
45 Variables 
1.  PR = Profit  = Value  added  - Wages 
2.  Q = output  = Value  added 
3.  KOR  =  Stock  of  Capital  per  unit  of 
replacement  cost. 
output  at 
4.  IKOR  = 
change 
Incremental  capital  output  ratio  =  The  average 
in  capital 
output. 
divided  by  the  average  change  in 
5.  GRSH  = Growth  rate  of constant  dollar  value  added  (see 
paper  for equation). 
6.  IMSH = Imports/(Imports  + Shipments) 
Date are only available  for the years  1972-1981. 
46 Table  5A 
Two Digit  Pooled  Regression  Results 
Germany,  Manufacturing,  1972-1981 
(T - Scores  in Parentheses) 
(Dependent Variables  - PR/Q) 
IEquations  I  1  2  3  I 
I  I 
IConst.  I  .374  * 
1  (16.019) 
KOR  I  0.012 
I  (0.871 
IMSH  I  -.427  0.34 
1  (-2.832)  (-2.11) 
GRSH  I 
I  *  I 
I 




I  .09 
IADj R2  .006 
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47 Table  5B 
TWO  Digit  Pooled  Regression  Results 
France,  ManUfaCtUring,  1972-1982 
(T  -  sCOr8S  in  Parentheses) 
(Dependent  Variables  =  PR/Q) 
IEquation  I  1  2  3  I 
I 
IConst.  I  .315 
I  l  (18.291) 
[KOR 
I  I 
I IMSH  _  I  -.130 
I  l  (-1.483) 
IGRSH 
I  I 
(IKOR  I 
I 
lR2 
















48 Table  SC 
Two Digit  Pooled  Regression  Results 
Italy,  Manufacturing,  1972-1981 
(T  -  Scores  in Parentheses) 
(Dependent Variable  = PR/* 
IEquation  I  1  2  3  I 
I 
IConts.  I 
;fX”,,,, 
*  *  I 
I 




IIMSH  -.486  -.448  -.726 
I 
IGRSH  I 




I  -.005 
I 
lR2 
IAdj  R2 
I 
(-1.37) 
.260  . 312 
I  .191  . 241 
49 Tab18  5D 
TWO  Digit  Pooled  RegreSSiOn  Results 
U.K.,  Manufacturing,  1972-1982 
(T  -  Scores  in  Parentheses) 
(Dependent  Variable  =  PR/Q) 

















*  * 




-.245  -.235  -.274 
I  (-2.027) 
1 








.114  .298  ! 
I  .  031  .226  I 
50 Table  SE 
Two  Digit  Pooled  R8gr8SSiOn  R8SUltS 
U.S.,  Manufacturing,  1972-1981 
- Scores  in  Parentheses) 
~&mxIent  Variable  =  PR/Q) 
/Equation  I  1  2  3  I 
I  I 
IConst.  .295  *  * 
I 
IKOR  i 




IIMSH  -.229  -.373  -.290 
I  (-2.533)  (-4.43)  (-2.97) 
IGRSH 






I  (-.221) 
. 320  . 118 
IAdj  R2  .256  . 028 
51 Table  SF 
Two Digit Pooled Regression Results 
Japan, Manufacturing, 1972-1981 
- Scores  in Parenthesis) 
((DTependent  Variables  = PR/Q) 
IEquation  I  1  2  3  I 
I 
I  I  I 









.432  * 
(24.090) 
;:","8) 
1.103  .935 














.  089 
52 Table 5G 
Two Digit Pooled Regression Results 
Total  All  Countires,  Manufacturing,  1972-1981 
(T - Scores in Parentheses) 
(Dependent  Variable = PR/Q) 













IAdj  R2 
.364  * 
(20.321) 
;E1, 
-.480  -.611 
















Table  SE reveals that  the results for the United States are 
very  similar  to  those  reported  in Table  2.  In the  classical 
equation, for example, there is a highly significant and positive 
relationship  between  the  dependent  variable  profit  margin  and 
capital.  This  is the same relationship which was found in our 
original data  set displayed in Table 2.  Similarly, there is a 
strong negative relationship with the import share as was found 
earlier.  In the Post Keynesian equation, as in Table 2, there is 
a negative relationship between the long run growth rate and the 
mark  up  (profit margin)  for this  period.  The  only difference 
with  our  earlier  result  is  the  relationship  between  the 
incremental capital output ratio and the dependent variable.  In 
the  earlier  estimation  a  strong  positive  and  significant 
relationship was  evident.  In the EUROSTAT data  no  significant 
relationship  was  found.  This  might  be  due  to  the  lack  of 
consistent investment data in the EUROSTAT data base. 
Given the  similarity of results between the  two data sets 
for the United States, It is interesting that relationships found 
for the European Countries are quite different.  I suspect that a 
large measure of this difference is due to the stronger influence 
of the intamational  economy on these countries as compared with 
the Unit&  States. 
In the classical equations, there is a strong negative and 
significant relationship between capital and profit  in both the 
U.K.  and  in  Italy.  This  result  is  difficult  to  understand 
54 because  it  means  that  there  is  little  or  no  tendency  toward  an 
equalization  of the  rate  of profit  over  the ten years  studied  in 
these  two  countries.  Similarly,  in  Germany,  the  relationship 
between  these  two  variables  is  negative,  although  not 
significant.  Only  France  displays  a  significant  positive 
relationship  between  capital  and profit  similar  to that  found  in 
the  United  States.  The  Japanese  relationship  is  positive,  but 
only weakly  significant. 
The  situation  is quite  the  contrary  regarding  the  impact  of 
the  import  share  on  the  industrial  profit  margin.  In  every 
European  country,  as  well  as  the  United  States,  there  is  a 
significant  negative  relationship  between  these  two  variables. 
Only  Japan  displays  a positive  significant  relationship  between 
the  share  of  imports  in  each  industry  and  its  profit  margin. 
This  might  be  the  result  of  Japan's  superior  position 
internationally  during  this  period.  Nevertheless,  since  the 
results  represent  a  cross  sectionally  relationship  they  are 
difficult  to understand. 
The  positive  relationship  hypothesized  by  the  Post- 
Keynesians  between  the  markup  and  the  long  industrial  rate  of 
growth  has  mixed  results  in  this  data  base.  We  found  earlier 
that  in the United  States,  this relationship  was negative  for the 
period  of the  1970's.  However,  this  is not the case  for a number 
of  other  countries,  France,  Italy,  and the U.K.  display  positive 
significant  relationships  between  the  markup  and  the  industrial 
55 growth  rate,  while  in Germany  and Japan  the  relationship  has the 
right  sign but  is insignificant. 
In  no  country  did  I  obtain  a  significant  positive 
relationship  between  the incremental  capital  output  ratio and the 
profit  margin  as  was  found  earlier.  Only  in  Japan  is  the 
relationship  significant  although  the  sign  is  wrong.  As 
mentioned  earlier,  this  variable  was  built  in  a  questionable 
fashion  because  of  data  limitation.  A  more  accurate variable 
construction might 
the United States. 
In all cases, 
reveal a result closer to that obtained  for 
the R-Squared,and Adjusted R-Squared terms are 
comparable or superior to those obtained earlier. 
56 Conclusion 
Although  a  comparative  empirical  study  of  countries  other 
than  the  U.S.  on  an  industry  basis  present  a  very  difficult 
situation  as regards  data  availability,  the similarity  of results 
for  those  obtained  for  the  United  States  offers  some  basis  for 
confidence.  It  is  clear  that  if  these  results  can  be  taken 
seriously,  they reveal  great  differences  between  the situation  in 
the  United  States  and  Europe  and  Japan.  Unlike  the  United 
States,  government  intervention  and  international  influences  are 
much  stronger  in these  countries.  This makes  a test  of the basic 
paradigmatic  story  of the three  competing  theories  which  assume  a 
pure  market  economy  even  more  problematic  than  was  the  case  for 
the  United  States.  Nevertheless,  the  growing  availability  of 
industry  level  data  for Europe  and Japan  must  not  be  ignored  and 
should  be  exploited  in  further  inquiries.  As  stated  in  our 
paper's  conclusion,  we view  this work  as only  a first  step  in an 
ongoing  dialogue.  Future  empirical  tests  will  hopefully  begin 
to  introduce  further  empirical  controls  and  investigate  deeper 
levels  of the competing  approaches. 
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